Publication: Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?
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Date
1988
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American Economic Association
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Alesina, Alberto, and Allan Drazen. 1991. Why are stabilizations delayed? American Economic Review 81(5): 1170-1188.
Abstract
When a stabilization has significant distributional implications (e.g., tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit), socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups. The process leading to stabilization becomes a "war of attrition," each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden. We solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of "rational" delay and relate it to several political and economic variables. We motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes.
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