Publication: A Modular Framework for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
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Date
2008
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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
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Citation
Lahaie, Sébastien, and David C. Parkes. 2008. A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. SIGecom Exchanges 7(2).
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Abstract
We describe a modular elicitation framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. The framework includes proxy agents, each of which can adopt an individualized bidding language to represent partial value information of a bidder. The framework leverages algorithms from query learning to elicit value information via bids as the auction progresses. The approach reduces the multi-agent elicitation problem to isolated, single-agent learning problems, with competitive equilibrium prices used to facilitate auction clearing even without complete learning.
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Keywords
combinatorial auction, preference elicitation, query learning
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