Publication: Online Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
Loading...
Open/View Files
Date
2007
Published Version
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.
Citation
Constantin, Florin, Takayuki Ito, and David C. Parkes. 2007. Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values. In Proceedings of the sixth international joint conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems 2007, AAMAS '07: May 14-18, 2007, Honolulu, Hawaii, ed. IFAAMAS, 110. New York, NY: ACM Press.
Abstract
Interdependent values (IDV) is a valuation model allowing bidders in an auction to express their value for the item(s) to sell as a function of the other bidders' information. We investigate the incentive compatibility (IC) of single-item auctions for IDV bidders in dynamic environments. We provide a necessary and sufficient characterization for IC in this setting. We show that if bidders can misreport departure times and private signals, no reasonable auction can be IC. We present a reasonable IC auction for the case where bidders cannot misreport departures.
Description
Other Available Sources
Research Data
Keywords
dynamic auctions, incentive compatibility, interdependent
Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material (LAA), as set forth at Terms of Service