Publication:
Evolutionary Dynamics in Set Structured Populations

Thumbnail Image

Date

2009

Published Version

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

National Academy of Sciences
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.

Research Projects

Organizational Units

Journal Issue

Citation

Tarnita Corina E., Tibor Antal, Hisashi Ohtsuki, Martin A. Nowak. 2009. Evolutionary dynamics in set structured populations. Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences USA 106(21): 8601-8604.

Research Data

Abstract

Evolutionary dynamics are strongly affected by population structure. The outcome of an evolutionary process in a well-mixed population can be very different from that in a structured population. We introduce a powerful method to study dynamical population structure: evolutionary set theory. The individuals of a population are distributed over sets. Individuals interact with others who are in the same set. Any 2 individuals can have several sets in common. Some sets can be empty, whereas others have many members. Interactions occur in terms of an evolutionary game. The payoff of the game is interpreted as fitness. Both the strategy and the set memberships change under evolutionary updating. Therefore, the population structure itself is a consequence of evolutionary dynamics. We construct a general mathematical approach for studying any evolutionary game in set structured populations. As a particular example, we study the evolution of cooperation and derive precise conditions for cooperators to be selected over defectors.

Description

Keywords

cooperation, social behavior, stochastic dynamics

Terms of Use

This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material (LAA), as set forth at Terms of Service

Endorsement

Review

Supplemented By

Referenced By

Related Stories