Publication: An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction
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2002
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Parkes, David C., and Lyle H. Ungar. 2002. An ascending-price generalized Vickrey auction. Paper presented at the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop: The Economics of the Internet: June 25-29, 2002.
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Abstract
A simple characterization of the equilibrium conditions required to
compute Vickrey payments in the Combinatorial Allocation Problem leads
to an ascending price Generalized Vickrey Auction. The ascending auc-
tion, iBundle Extend & Adjust (iBEA), maintains non-linear and perhaps
non-anonymous prices on bundles of items, and terminates with the ef-
cient allocation and the Vickrey payments in ex post Nash equilibrium.
Crucially, iBEA is able to implement the Vickrey outcome even when the
Vickrey payments are not supported in a single competitive equilibrium.
The auction closes with Universal competitive equilibrium prices, which
provide enough information to compute individualized discounts to adjust
the nal prices and implement Vickrey payments.
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