Publication: Against Intentionalism
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Date
2007
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Springer Verlag
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Nickel, Bernhard. 2007. Against intentionalism. Philosophical Studies 136(3): 279-304.
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Abstract
Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a
perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper
presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to superficially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke’s examples cannot be extended to mine. If Intentionalism fails, it is impossible to reduce the phenomenology of an experience to its content.
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