Publication: Information, Institutions and, Constitutional Arrangements
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Date
2009
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Springer Verlag
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Citation
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2009. Information, institutions, and constitutional arrangements. Public Choice 144(1-2): 1-36.
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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered-term (overlapping generations) organizations such as legislative bodies. Our model is a simple stochastic game of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships. Our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the “constitutional moment”. First, they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows (imperfectly informed) legislators with information about the history of play. Second, we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures.
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Keywords
institutions, staggered-term legislatures, overlapping generations, transparency, principal-agents
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