Publication: SELLING ORGANS: THE ANSWER TO THE BURGEONING ORGAN DEFICIT
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2002
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SELLING ORGANS: THE ANSWER TO THE BURGEONING ORGAN DEFICIT (2002 Third Year Paper)
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Abstract
Despite the outwardly strong controversy of compensating donors for their organs, it is apparent that, at the very least, the federal government, the primary entity that can effect change and ameliorate the lack of supply of transplantable organs, has realized that the status quo is currently letting fifteen people die unnecessary, tragic deaths everyday. Unfortunately, especially for those patients on waiting lists, the government does not seem even remotely close to instituting the rational, functional answer that can easily address the supply problem – repealing the federal law against donors receiving compensation for their organs. Furthermore, there are signs, as exhibited in editorials and select television reports that a majority of the American populace is slowly shedding its total aversion to donors receiving compensation for their organs. This paper advocates a free market based approach to organ donation with a small degree of government regulation to prevent abuse. In realization of the vociferous yet misguided opposition to implementing such a solution, this paper supports, as the next best practical alternative, the federal government, at a minimum, enabling deceased donors to receive compensation for their organs.
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Food and Drug Law, organs, donors, transplants, regulation
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