The Politics of Food: How Cuba Teamed Up With U.S. Food and Agricultural Interests to Outmaneuver the Pro-Embargo Lobby

Abstract

This paper will show that in the recent past the Cuban government, with the help of the U.S. food and agricultural lobby, has altered its strategy for dealing with the U.S.—at least with respect to the Cuban government’s efforts at getting the remnants of the trade sanctions against it lifted. Instead of deploying its customary loud rhetoric in opposition to the embargo, the Cuban government has co-opted, if you will, an important United States constituency to help it in its crusade. By way of background, Part III of this paper describes in broad terms the United States statutes that interact to form the legislative bases upon which the trade sanctions against Cuba are founded. Then Part IV examines the most recent successful Congressional effort to ease the current trade sanctions, as well as the imposition of some additional hurdles to normalized commercial relations. Part V analyzes in some detail the “charm offensive†strategy that Cuba adopted—with the help of United States food and agricultural interests—in an effort to make an end run around the pro-embargo lobby. Then Part VI examines—primarily in the context of wrangling between the Executive and Legislative branches of our federal government—some of the major policy arguments customarily employed in normative debates involving the desirability of the remaining trade sanctions. Finally, Part VII concludes with some observations and comments.