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The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations

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2001

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Annual Reviews
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Broz, J. Lawrence, and Jeffry A. Frieden. 2001. “The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (1) (June): 317–343. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.317.

Abstract

The structure of international monetary relations has gained increasing prominence over the past two decades. Both national exchange rate policy and the character of the international monetary system require explanation. At the national level, the choice of exchange rate regime and the desired level of the exchange rate involve distributionally relevant tradeoffs. Interest group and partisan pressures, the structure of political institutions, and the electoral incentives of politicians therefore influence exchange rate regime and level decisions. At the international level, the character of the international monetary system depends on strategic interaction among governments, driven by their national concerns and constrained by the international environment. A global or regional fixed-rate currency regime, in particular, requires at least coordination and often explicit cooperation among national governments.

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