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Property as the Law of Things

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2012

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Harvard University, Harvard Law School
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Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691 (2012).

Abstract

The New Private Law takes seriously the need for baselines in general and the traditional ones furnished by the law in particular. One such baseline is the “things” of property. The bundle of rights picture popularized by the Legal Realists downplayed things and promoted the expectation that features of property are detachable and tailorable without limit. The bundle picture captures too much to be a theory. By contrast, the information cost, or architectural, theory proposed here captures how the features of property work together to achieve property’s purposes. Drawing on Herbert Simon’s notions of nearly decomposable systems and modularity, the article shows how property employs a thing-based exclusion-governance architecture to manage complexity of the interactions between legal actors. Modular property first breaks this system of interactions into components, and this begins with defining the modular things of property. Property then specifies the interface between the modular components of property through governance strategies that make more direct reference to uses and purposes, as in the law of nuisance, covenants, and zoning. In contrast to the bundle of rights picture, the modular theory captures how a great number of features of property – ranging from in-rem-ness, the right to exclude, and the residual claim, through alienability, persistence, and compatibility, and beyond to deep aspects like recursiveness, scalability, and resilience – follow from the modular architecture. The Article then shows how the information cost theory helps explain some puzzling phenomena such as the pedis possessio in mining law, fencing in and fencing out, the unit rule in eminent domain, and the intersection of state action and the enforcement of covenants. The Article concludes with some implications of property as a law of modular things for the architecture of private law.

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Property as the Law of Things… : DASH Story 2016-07-08
I am a retired attorney whose former practice included a significant amount of international litigation and arbitration. I just received a telephone call from the daughter of a family friend who recently graduated from law school and is presently representing an elderly client pro bono in an action involving real property in a civil law nation. She was perplexed as to why, as a native bilingual speaker of the foreign language, she still found it impossible to ascertain from the foreign laws the nature of her client's rights/interests in said property under the foreign law, describing her conversations with foreign counsel on the matter as "speaking past each other." The problem, not surprisingly, lay in her assumption that there existed some objective, universal definition of "property rights." Smith's masterful article on Property as the Law of Things revealed the nature of her fallacy far batter than any explanation of mine ever could.