Justice, Work, and the Ghetto Poor

Abstract

In view of the explanatory significance of joblessness, some social scientists, policymakers,and commentators have advocated strong measures to ensure that the ghetto poor work, includingmandating work as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. Indeed, across the ideological po-litical spectrum, work is often seen as a moral or civic duty and as a necessary basis for personaldignity. And this normative stance is now instantiated in federal and state law, from the tax schemeto public benefits. This Article reflects critically on this new regime of work. I ask whether thenormative principles to which its advocates typically appeal actually justify the regime. I concludethat the case for a pro tanto moral or civic duty to work is not as strong as many believe and thatthere are reasonable responses to joblessness that do not involve instituting a work regime. How-ever, even if we grant that there is a duty to work, I maintain that the ghetto poor would not bewronging their fellow citizens were they to choose not to work and to rely on public funds for ma-terial support. In fact, I argue that many among the black urban poor have good reasons to refuse towork. Throughout, I emphasize what too few advocates of the new work regime do, namely, thatwhether work is an obligation depends crucially on whether background social conditions withinthe polity are just.