Publication: Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production
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Date
2014
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Oxford University Press (OUP)
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Antràs, Pol. 2014. Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 30, suppl 1: i118–i175.
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Abstract
I survey the influence of Grossman and Hart's (1986) “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” 94 Journal of Political Economy 691–719.) seminal paper in the field of International Trade. I discuss the implementation of the theory in open-economy environments and its implications for the international organization of production and the structure of international trade flows. I also review empirical work suggestive of the empirical relevance of the property-rights theory. Along the way, I develop novel theoretical results and also outline some of the key limitations of existing contributions.
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Keywords
intrafirm trade, multinational firms, outsourcing, property rights
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