Iran's Situations: Military Violence, Protests, and Group Dynamics

Abstract

Iran is a country with a rich history of successful social movements and not so successful ones. The two most recent ones---1979 and 2009---set up a very unique puzzle that sheds some light not only on the factors of micro-variation (in levels of violence against protesters) within states over time, but also on the factors that drive variation within a protest wave---factors that are related to the design of a state's security system (for example, multiple security force actors that provide options for protest policing). Explaining variation across and within these two cases requires that we think about the ensuing potential for violent conflict as inter-group related. In order to predict violence on protesters in Iran, it is necessary to measure the level of representativeness in the military organization, which I disaggregate at the level of the security force actor (Basij/IRGC/Artesh), and consider this in relation to the composition of the protesting crowd. The more representative a security force body within the military, the less likely is the outbreak of violence in any given protest event if that body is involved. This is because representative entities are less likely to view crowds as part of a threatening other.