Publication: Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games
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Date
2009
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Springer Nature
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Maskin, E. 2009. “Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games.” Games, Groups, and the Global Good: Springer Series in Game Theory: 79–84. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_4.
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Abstract
I discuss recent work that characterizes what outcomes correspond to evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player symmetric repeated games when players have a positive probability of making a mistake.
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