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Moneyball for State Regulators

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2014

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Harvard John M. Olin Center for law, Economics, and Business
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Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Moneyball for State Regulators (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series Discussion Paper No. 783, July 2014, Nat'l Aff., Summer 2014).

Abstract

For over thirty years, Republican and Democratic presidents have required executive agencies to assess the costs and benefits of significant regulations, and to proceed only if the benefits justify the costs (to the extent permitted by law). The goals of the resulting processes have been to constrain unjustified regulation, to promote interagency coordination, and to allow a degree of centralized management of what can be a cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus. Unfortunately, state and local governments sometimes impose costly requirements, undisciplined by careful analysis of their likely consequences. New institutions at the state level, producing such analysis, could be highly beneficial, replacing processes sometimes driven by anecdotes, dogmas, emotions, and interest-group pressures with a form of Regulatory Moneyball.

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