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Species, Humans, and Transformations

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2015-08-21

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Lambert, Enoch. 2015. Species, Humans, and Transformations. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences.

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Do biological species have essences? The debate over this question in philosophy of biology exhibits fundamental confusion both between and within authors. In What to Salvage from the Species Essentialism Debate, I argue that the best way forward is to drop the question and its terms in order to make progress on two issues: how to individuate species taxa; and how to make sense of changes in explanatory frameworks across the Darwinian historical divide. I further argue that a primary motivation for anti-essentialism, biological variation, matters differently to each project. Anti-essentialism in the philosophy of biology has inspired influential rejections of the idea that there is such a thing as human nature. In More Bark than Bite, I show that the arguments are significantly weaker than supposed. Moreover, none of the weighty consequences thought to follow from any genuine sense in which there is no human nature, actually do follow. The evolution-based denial of human nature has little to contribute to inquiries into the human condition, both philosophical and scientific. Decisions about whether to undergo experiences that could change the very preference-base on which the choice is made are “transformative”. L. A. Paul argues that transformative decisions present a problem for standard decision theory when approached in a way that leans on evaluations of the experiential consequences of the choices. Her solution proposes that we approach such decisions by asking ourselves how much we value the kind of discovery involved in transformative experience. In Shifting Attention on Transformative Choice, I present two problems for her solution and offer an alternative. Transformative decisions may be rationally approached by asking ourselves how much we judge the activities on the other side of transformation to be worthwhile. This proposal helps make better sense of our relationship to experiential consequences of transformation, which is more flexible than Paul acknowledges.

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Philosophy, Biology, General, Psychology, General

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