Essays on Criminal Organizations, Violence, and Order

Abstract

The essays in this dissertation examine the patterns through which illicit markets, and the criminal organizations that profit from them, impact local violence and order. The first essay draws on “stationary bandit” theories to argue that criminal gangs that maintain uncontested control of territory are more likely to promote broader social order. Using spatial data on gang territory and crime in Chicago, the paper shows that lower levels of gang competition are associated with lower levels of predatory violence like robbery. However, such groups may also use their capacities for violence to distort local markets by selectively preying on residents. Drawing on fine-grained qualitative and quantitative data from Los Angeles, the second essay argues that ethnic attacks on non-gang “civilians” are driven by attempts of gang leaders to ensure that coethnics, from whom they can extract rents, dominate profitable illicit drug markets. The third essay examines violence against the press in Mexico, showing that criminal organizations are more likely to resort to fatal attacks on journalists when they compete for territory, because such competition inhibits their ability to peacefully govern the information that reaches the public.