The Case for Institutionalizing Nuclear Munitions: A Probabilistic Game Theory Analysis

Abstract

The spread of nuclear weapons is a hotly debated topic, with two dominating schools of thought. One school espouses the belief that horizontal nuclear proliferation is inevitable and that increased proliferation engenders nuclear deterrence. The other school of thought argues that nuclear weapons are an ever-present risk, and that we should strive for near-zero reduction of nuclear armaments. This thesis hypothesizes that there is a third option in which nuclear deterrence can be held by a collective versus a single nation-state, which can then engender trust and increase security. The methods used to prove this hypothesis are based on evaluating multiple scenarios of both acquisition and use, and evaluating how institutionalized nuclear weapons would work under each of these scenarios. In this thesis, we reconsider the assumptions of proliferation, and use probabilistic analysis and a game theory payoff model to understand how an institutional model may mitigate risk.