Emerging Anti-satellite Capabilities and the Recourse to Deterrence Theory in Practice

Abstract

The expansion of space-based capabilities has ballooned over the past six decades in response to the rapid growth of technological advancements and simultaneous lowering of costs for their production. Satellites are now being relied upon to provide support for essential military operations in addition to global society’s daily activities. However, the largely inferential nature of satellite capabilities suggest that deterrence as a theoretical and strategic construct may not effectively function in the outer space environment. Juxtaposed against nuclear deterrence which relies on the physical exhibition of military power, satellite capabilities such as non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber are not readily visible, thus diminishing the levels of perceptibility and signaling strength necessary for successful deterrence. The purpose of this thesis is twofold: 1) to provide a theoretical analysis of deterrence in outer space, and 2) to empirically test the utility of inferential anti-satellite capabilities. The first half will examine literature on the theoretical revision of deterrence, focusing on the principle of credibility. The second half will test the efficacy of the use of inferential deterrence strategies by applying it to a revised expected utility model. The investigation of both theoretical and empirical dimensions of deterrence theory can provide the groundwork for expanded research in the field; especially in a continually evolving international system.