Crime and Democracy: Central America in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

This dissertation explores the relationship between organized crime and liberal democracy. Across three papers, I draw on evidence from Central America to generate new theoretical and empirical insights about how crime (re)shapes—and often undermines—democratic institutions. The first paper examines the relationship between organized crime and the durability of democracy. I show that organized crime can facilitate democratic reversals through both "supply-side" and "demand-side" effects. The second paper introduces the concept of criminal electioneering: deliberate efforts by criminal groups to influence elections. I provide a typology of criminal electioneering strategies and argue that criminals are more likely to engage in electioneering (a) when they are locked in direct competition with rival criminal groups and (b) when candidates are in close "resource races" with their electoral opponents. The final paper examines the determinants of support for "authoritarian bargains" related to public security. Using survey evidence from Guatemala, I show that information about the costs of harsh anti-crime policies for democracy tempers support for those policies among voters—even in contexts of high crime and insecurity.