Militarism, Civilianism, and the Normative Theory of Democratic Civil-Military Relations

Abstract

How should the normative commitments entailed by liberal-democracy inform the choices that must be made regarding the military as an institution? This dissertation argues that liberal-democratic civil-military relations should aim at avoiding both militarism and anti-militarism, and instead aim at civilianism: a state of affairs in which the contributions and benefits of military values, institutions, and practices are permitted and used, but in subordination to liberal-democratic values and institutions. Such values and insitutions include, but are not limited to equal citizenship, justice, participation, representation, and freedom. The hierarchical nature of the military, its emphasis on obedience, its armed power, and its symbolic capital can all pose a risk to liberal democracy, suggesting we should limit the domestic role of the military as much as possible. And while there is some truth to this fear, complete avoidance ignores possible affinities between the military and democratic ideals and institutions. Civilianism is achieved when these two ways of thinking about the relationship between the military and democracy are balanced. I demonstrate the force of this position through discussion of three major normative questions of civil-military relations: How should a democracy raise its military? What grounds the demand for civilian control of the military and what are its limits? And when is domestic use of the military and militarized force permissible? The answers to these questions are independently valuable, and add up to an institutional normative approach to the interplay between democracy and the military.