Bargain, Babble, or Battle? Cheap Talk and the Judicial Review Process Under 8 USC § 1189

Abstract

In this dissertation the judicial review process under 8 USC § 1189 is formally modeled as a cheap talk game. The model makes specific assumptions about the ways in which the judiciary and the FTO interact and bargain with one another. Two possible outcomes are predicted by the model: a babbling equilibrium and a partially information revealing equilibrium. In the babbling equilibrium, the judiciary treats all messages passed by the FTO as devoid of any informational content. In the partially information revealing equilibrium, an informative equilibrium exists and information flows from the FTO to the judiciary so long as their preferences are sufficiently aligned. The predictions of this model are then analyzed using a case study approach to determine whether the legal challenge by the Mojahedin-e Khalq (“MeK”) were partially information revealing, babbling, or evolved over time.