Essays on Industrial Organization and Labor Economics

Abstract

This dissertation consists of three chapters at the intersection of industrial organization and labor economics. The first chapter explores the impacts of political incentives on China’s land and housing market. I develop and estimate a dynamic, infinite-horizon model of land supply using manager-city-year level data. I infer city managers’ weights on career advancement relative to land revenues. Using the parameter estimates, I then study the counterfactual land allocation and housing construction absent political incentives. The second chapter asks whether law school alumni relationships between lawyers and judges affect case outcomes. I show that in the context of medical malpractice lawsuits in Florida, the plaintiff lawyers are more likely to win cases if they share the same law school as the judge. Moreover, the effect is strong among less experienced lawyers. The third chapter evaluates the distributional impacts of ending selective admission. I first theoretically analyze primary school enrollment under both selective admission and neighborhood schooling. Then empirically, I provide evidence on household preference and local housing market responses to the policy shock taking Beijing as an example.