Assessing the Measurement of Gubernatorial Budgetary Power

Abstract

The subject of studying the budgetary power of state governors has largely been expressed on a macro level. The budgetary power is the most important piece of legislation that governors have to deal with on an annual basis. Governors cannot implement their legislative and administrative visions for the state, if they are not otherwise given the funds to do it. The most recognized method for measuring the formal and informal powers of state governors was created by Joseph A. Schlesinger in 1960, with Thad Beyle carrying on the work and providing periodical updates to the index. The existing Beyle score does not incorporate the powers the legislature has in amending those powers, and also does not seek to find what the governor can do to counteract these amendatory powers. The Beyle score falls short in recognizing what could happen after the legislature amends the budget. Measuring the budgetary power can be important for scholars and citizens alike. Further knowledge of the governor’s role in the political process can give voters and researchers a better sense of what a governor may be able to accomplish, and may serve as a possible predictor of policy success. This thesis reviews and reworks the Beyle score in an effort to identify power differences between states in terms of budgetary power. A time period comparison for the years 1980-2005 shows that the new score find less change in budgetary power than the Beyle score.