Killing the Innocent: A Theory of Violent Interactions between Regimes and Resistors

Abstract

I study the motivations for, and responses to, violent regime repression of civilian dissent. The effects of violent interactions on the form of resistance that anti-regime civilians opt for are not well understood. I start with a model which frames violence as a strategic choice for the regime, and responses to violence as type-dependent for civilians. I then test the predictions of the model on a novel dataset on regime-civilian interactions in the ongoing Myanmar coup. By exploiting correlations linked to my model’s framework, and plausibly exogenous shocks to civilians’ perceptions of the level of regime violence, I show that regime violence polarises anti-regime civilians. Types below a threshold choose no or low-effort forms of resistance when confronted with regime violence. Types above a threshold resort to more high-effort, extreme forms of resistance. The regime’s optimal level of violence to wield is thus a function of the distribution of anti-regime types, and the resources available to anti-regime civilians to manifest their opposition against the regime. Incorrect prior beliefs on the part of the regime and anti-regime civilians complicate their convergence to optimal strategies. Taken together, my results emphasise that regime violence neither universally stymies resistance, nor incites it; it fractures the response in important ways.