Morality of Plunder and Economy of Protection: Ottoman Corsairs in Mediterranean Trade Networks and Warfare, 1574-1685

Abstract

Mediterranean seafarers engaged in various forms of armed conflict throughout the seventeenth century. Among their career options, piracy existed as an alternative that bore high risks and offered attractive returns. This profession became especially popular on the North African coasts and shaped the lives and livelihoods of millions who received their fair share of threats, captivities, battles, plunders, and profits. This dissertation identifies the multilayered connections between piracy and its spin-off institution, corsairing, and the tools of economic and military competitions, which evolved in conformity with the changing methods of empire-building in this period. With a focus on the corsairs based in Tunis, a quasi-autonomous Ottoman province at the time, I trace these connections to argue that corsairing, distinct from both piracy and privateering, was not simply a problem of unlawful raids or short-sighted economic ambitions dominating local politics. Instead, it was a self-determining business alternative that adapted to the changing structure of commercial networks and the political relations between Mediterranean states. Corsairs were able to differentiate their operations from ordinary plunder, and, in turn, states and merchant enterprises encouraged corsairing as a necessary evil for the materialization of protection rents rather than categorically vilifying and tackling it as destructive to trade. By studying piracy and corsairing as distinct elements in the markets for protection, this dissertation shows that piracy caused increased risks, losses, and expenses for some parties, but at the same time, and not necessarily in a short-term perspective, it formed the foundations for corsairing to develop, which yielded mobility, revenue, income opportunities, and rents for many others.