Who Guards the Guardians? Political Accountability over the Police in the United States

Abstract

Under what conditions can citizens hold government officials accountable for their behavior? I examine accountability over the police, a pervasive face of the state as experienced by most people. Like elected politicians, police enjoy significant discretion, limited oversight, power, and corruptibility. Continued problems of police violence and disparate treatment, especially against Black Americans, have shown the importance of accountable policing. Using calls for service records, election returns, survey data, and case studies, I explore challenges of political accountability across the highly varied 18,000 police department in the United States. The police are both a nationally salient social group – evaluated differently by partisans in a national media environment – as well as a locally-provided government function that tens of millions of Americans encounter regularly. This decentralization complicates improvements to policing policies by limiting the impacts of reform activism to particular cities and by misaligning activism with local conditions (Chapter 1). Millions of Americans regularly call the police to manage a swathe of urgent problems. Examining whether citizens punish street-level bureaucrats for misbehavior by withdrawing from demands for police intervention, I find that daily demands for policing services remain steady after well-publicized police abuse (Chapter 2). Absent exit, change requires political action. One manifestation of the varieties of American policing is between elected and appointed police leadership. I show that each approach has problems: elected sheriffs seem too steady in their offices – over which they enjoy almost unfettered control and significant incumbency advantage – while appointed police chiefs are constrained by unions, politicians, and the public (Chapter 3). Drawing on case studies of immigration enforcement in county jails, I show that nationally salient issues can impinge on the domains of county Sheriffs and increase interest and energy in local elections – aligning policies with preferences through a process I term “redirected nationalization” (Chapter 4). An additional problem is that police officers are themselves political agents who can resist change. By analyzing their nearly universal support for Donald Trump in the 2016 election, and the status of police as a salient cleavage in American electoral politics, I show a strong affinity between police union and right-wing politics rooted in the sense that police are “under siege” by Black Lives Matter and calls for reform (Chapter 5). This uniform conservative orientation of police culture clashes with the array of problems the police manage, which frequently include homelessness and mental illness (Chapter 6, co-authored with Jacob Brown). I conclude that, where possible, it is better to unbundle the multifaceted police role, with specialized civil servants responding to classes of problems (Chapter 7). However, the decentralization of policing in the United States and the ambiguity of many calls for services will complicate unbundling. Hence, there remains a need to cultivate a police culture sensitive to the range of problems police encounter and, longer term, to ameliorate the social conditions which drive reliance on police services.