Not Impartial: United States Relations With the United Kingdom During the Suez and Falklands Crises

Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to better understand the decision-making process that occurred within the United States during the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the Falklands War of 1982. Specifically, why did the United States not assist its traditional ally, the United Kingdom, during the Suez Crisis, but chose to aid them during the Falklands War? This is undertaken in this work by reviewing both events under the Model I, II, and III method as described by Graham Allision in his book Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Examining the history behind the two events via these three methods allows for a more complete understanding of the process which ultimately ended with the opposing American decisions. Reviewing both events chronologically, and then comparatively, this paper ultimately finds that the decision to not assist during Suez, and to assist during the Falklands, was the United States maximizing its perceived benefits. This is within the confines of Model I-Rational Actor Model. The United States sought to prevent the spread of communism within the Middle East during the Suez Crisis, and so looked for allies outside of its traditional partner, the United Kingdom. Later, during the Falklands War, the United States instead of seeking allies within the South Atlantic, sought to promote the right to self-determination. Ultimately, the decisions made by American leadership tried to best promote American interests, and those interests changed during these time frames, first damaging, and then promoting the Anglo-American special relationship.