Ukraine’s Denuclearization and Alternatives

Abstract

The thesis seeks to understand the major influencers behind Ukraine’s denuclearization outcome in the form of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which stipulated vague security assurances from the US, the UK, and Russia to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for returning to Russia the Soviet nuclear weapons Ukraine inherited after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The thesis discusses five influencers or independent variables and their impact on the denuclearization outcome. Specifically, the variables involve Ukraine’s inability to control the inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons’ fast-approaching expiration dates, a multi-billion-dollar compensation for the inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, the US diplomatic and financial support, and security and economic threats posed by Russia. Furthermore, to support the premise that a nuclear Ukraine was feasible, the thesis explores a counterfactual scenario of Ukraine managing to retain and operate the inherited tactical nuclear weapons before their removal to Russia from 1991 to 1992. The thesis concludes that the inherited tactical nuclear weapons were the only route for Ukraine to become a nuclear power in the early 1990s, as obtaining the long-sought security guarantees from the US and the UK to deter Russia was not feasible. The thesis also points out that with the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons’ fast-approaching expiration dates, Ukraine would have to develop its own nuclear deterrent eventually. Such a scenario would have likely prevented the annexation of Crimea and a full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war with millions of casualties.