Ordering Repression: Coercive Institutions and Strategies in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Why do authoritarian regimes vary in their ability to effectively repress social threats? Research on social repression and authoritarian regimes has studied a wide range of repression practices and established a relationship between powerful state coercion and authoritarian durability. Yet fewer studies have attempted to elaborate and compare the specific mechanisms through which various forms of repression work to strengthen authoritarian rule. I argue that regimes’ choices of coercive institutions and repression strategies are two main factors contributing to repression effectiveness. Strong non-military internal security institutions are more capable than military institutions of implementing effective repression, as the military tends to be more inclined to engage in intense coercion and excessive targeting. In addition, regimes which conduct a pattern of precise repression are more likely to prevent the recurrence and escalation of social threats. Precise repression happens when regimes apply high-intensity coercion to subversive opposition groups and low-intensity coercion to loyal opposition groups. When regimes mismatch the intensity level of coercion with the nature of social threats, outcomes such as threat escalation and backlash are more likely to ensue, making the repression campaign less effective. I further argue that regime leaders’ career backgrounds and assessment of the general security environment play an important role in shaping how leaders perceive domestic security threats and choose coercive institutions and strategies. Empirical analysis of the dissertation looks at the Chinese regime from 1949 to the 1990s and the Mexican regime from the 1940s to the 1970s. With controlled comparative research of cross-time variations in China and cross-country variations between China and Mexico, I show that leaders of non-military regimes often enjoy discretion in choosing between military-dominated and police-dominated domestic security institutions. Military-dominated domestic repression was more likely to result in intense coercion and when combined with the regimes’ misperception of social threats, resulted in the eruption of massive popular challenges to the authoritarian rule. Although both governments managed to overcome the crises through military crackdowns, the divergent threat perceptions among regime leaders resulted in distinct evolutions of the coercive institutions and strategies in China and Mexico. These variations had longer-term implications on both regimes’ repression effectiveness and durability.