Publication: Lost in a Sandstorm: The U.S. attempt to win the war in Afghanistan
Loading...
Open/View Files
Date
2023-04-03
Authors
Published Version
Published Version
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you.
Citation
Tyler, Timothy Craig. 2023. Lost in a Sandstorm: The U.S. attempt to win the war in Afghanistan. Master's thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education.
Abstract
Abstract
Why did the U.S. lose the war in Afghanistan in the summer of 2021? Why did the U.S. fail there, after we poured hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign aid into the country, and had tens of thousands of advisers working for decades trying to improve the country? Dozens of nations, in Europe, Asia, and Oceania, sent troops and gave aid to Afghanistan. Why did things utterly fall apart?
The U.S. government had successfully fought a counterinsurgency war in El Salvador from 1980 – 1993 against the communist FMLN guerillas. A combination of increased aid, highly motivated American military advisors and constant U.S. intelligence support enabled the El Salvadorian Armed Forces to defeat the FMLN and forced them to agree to an armistice in 1993. Why did a similar military strategy fail in Afghanistan?
My thesis will argue that the failure of the U.S. to create a combat capable Afghan National Army led to the eventual collapse of Afghanistan, and the capture of Kabul and all of the Afghan provinces by the Taliban in the summer of 2021.
Description
Other Available Sources
Research Data
Keywords
Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, Operation Enduring Freedom, Taliban, History
Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material (LAA), as set forth at Terms of Service