Democratic transitions and party institutionalization

Abstract

This dissertation argues that variation in the party and party system institutionalization of Third Wave regimes is attributable to the mode of transition. The first paper distinguishes between modes of transition according to the relative strength of incumbent and opposition party organizations. It categorizes 55 Third Wave transitions (1974-2001) into impositions, pacts, and collapses, showing that modes of transition are associated with distinct rules and party-voter linkage structures. Imposed transitions led by strong authoritarian incumbents put oppositions under high levels of adversity, incentivizing investment in strong party organizations and producing stable, institutionalized party systems. Conversely, pacted transitions where incumbents and oppositions agree to share power guarantee entrants easy access to votes and finance, disincentivizing investment in and adaptation of party organizations. The second paper argues that political pacts are deleterious to party-building by incentivizing parties to collude, rely on inherited resources, and dilute their party brands. Brand dilution has negative consequences for parties’ internal cohesion, the level of mass partisanship, and parties’ public legitimacy. Evidence is marshalled from Latinobarómetro data and case studies of six parties in Mexico and Chile. The third paper argues that political pacts are deleterious to party-building by disincentivizing investment in complex, autonomous intraparty organizations. When parties depend on state finance, hand their leaders outsized authority, and demobilize mass actors, they are unlikely to cultivate mass memberships, adhere to intraparty institutions and norms, or descriptively represent salient social groups. Evidence is marshalled from party-financial disclosures, candidates’ lists, and Asia Barometer data from South Korea and Taiwan. The fourth paper investigates the relationship between modes of transition, party organizations, and party brands across a wide range of Third Wave democracies. Using data from 163 parties in 40 countries, I find the mode of transition durably conditions the organization- building and party-branding strategies of both authoritarian successor and opposition parties.