Hacking Moral Code: Can Cognitive Stimulation Impact Moral Semantic Processing?

Abstract

Can targeted cognitive stimulation impact the semantic processing of moral words like “fair?” When individuals apply a word like “fair” to different situations, do they make these judgements consistently or can they be altered with the activation of different cognitive functions within the brain? Recent research has demonstrated that semantic processing, in which the brain attributes meaning to words, may be composed of numerous cognitive functions also used in other mental processes, and that processing different kinds of words and concepts requires different component functions. Perhaps this theory can be extended to the meaning of individual words; that a word’s distinct meaning may come from a unique “package” of cognitive components. Thus, if the cognitive component “package” used by an individual to process a word is somehow modified, then the individual will interpret the meaning of that word differently. The researcher hypothesized that exposing individuals to cognitive stimulation activities, such as word analogy exercises, would activate cognitive functions related to perceiving equality and – in a phenomenon known as cognitive process priming – encourage the individuals to apply the word “fair” to more options presented in a spectrum of possible distributive justice outcomes for different business ethics dilemmas. In two “pre- and post-test” design experiments, each involving roughly 120-participants, results indicate significant word analogy effect on the application of the word “fair” in business ethics dilemmas related to intellectual property and company co-founder disputes. In the first experiment, using a quasi-experimental design with no randomized question order or control, intellectual property case responses (Dilemma 1) produced statistical scores of p=.021 and Cohen’s d = -.185, while company co-founder cases (Dilemma 2) produced p=.045 and Cohen’s d =-.155. In the second experiment, fully randomized in question order and with a control group, Dilemma 2 responses produced p=.040 and Cohen’s d = -.323 for all six trials, and scores of p=.015 and Cohen’s d = -.572 for the first three trials. Meanwhile, Dilemma 1 responses were significant, p=.040 and Cohen’s d = 1.063, only in the second trial. This data suggests that the word analogies did impact the semantic processing of the word “fair,” but only in the ethics dilemmas making cognitive demands similar in structure to those made in the analogy exercises, and that the effect dissipates quickly. If this phenomenon can be demonstrated for other cognitive functions and moral concepts, it could lead to new techniques in semantic measurement and computational modelling of complex social behavior, and new protocols for calibrating ethical discourse in public and professional forums. This phenomenon could also provide the foundation for a new paradigm of psychological warfare.