Communal Outrage as Deterrence

Abstract

There is converging evidence that the human mind includes a coalitional psychology: a set of neurocomputational systems that evolved to regulate within- and between-group cooperation and conflict. This dissertation tests the hypothesis that moral outrage is one component of that architecture. I propose moral outrage is an evolved psychological system for coalitional deterrence, triggered by cues that another person or group assigns insufficient weight to the welfare of one’s side and organized to mobilize collective action that can deter future mistreatment. Specific proximate design features should follow from this ultimate function: outrage should be calibrated by internal regulatory variables that index how a coalition is valued by other coalitions, how much available support one has on one’s side, and whether coordination with others is feasible. Chapter 1 lays out these predictions and the chapters that follow detail 11 studies (analytic N = 3,282) that test them. Chapter 2 shows that outrage is moderated both by how much participants infer their side is valued and by how much numerical support they believe they have. Chapter 3 shows that hostility toward groups produces stronger affective outrage and stronger motivations to spread information – and to do so selectively. Chapter 3 also shows that outrage expressed by third parties depends on whether the offender’s motive implicates them. Chapter 4 shows that common knowledge does not reliably increase outrage intensity, but it does consistently increase decisions about whether condemnation of an offense should be made public. Taken together, the findings support an account in which moral outrage is a deterrence system calibrated by coalition-relevant internal regulatory variables and structured to support coordinated social action.