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  4. The Rational Non-Candidate: A Theory of Candidate Deterrence

The Rational Non-Candidate: A Theory of Candidate Deterrence

Date
June 6, 2014
Author(s)
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Citation
Shames, Shauna Lani. 2014. The Rational Non-Candidate: A Theory of Candidate Deterrence. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
Abstract
This research presents results of a multi-year, multi-site investigation into the political ambition of young eligible candidates, with a focus on ambition gaps in gender and race. Using an original survey and interviews with an untested population (law and policy school students at elite
Terms of Use
Metadata Only
URI
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12271801
Subjects

Political Science

Women's studies

African American stud...

ambition

campaign

candidate

politics

race

women

Collection
FAS Theses and Dissertations
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