The Rational Non-Candidate: A Theory of Candidate Deterrence
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Shames, Shauna Lani. 2014. The Rational Non-Candidate: A Theory of Candidate Deterrence. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.Abstract
This research presents results of a multi-year, multi-site investigation into the political ambition of young eligible candidates, with a focus on ambition gaps in gender and race. Using an original survey and interviews with an untested population (law and policy school students at eliteCitable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12271801
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