Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties
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CitationNg, Chaki, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer. 2003. Strategyproof computing: Systems infrastructures for self-interested parties. Paper presented at the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems in Berkeley C.A., June 5-6, 2003.
AbstractThe widespread deployment of high-speed internet access is ushering in
a new era of distributed computing, in which parties both contribute to a global pool of shared resources and access the pooled resources to support their own computing needs. We argue that system designers must explicitly address the self-interest of individual parties if these next-generation computing systems are to flourish. We propose strategyproof computing, a vision for an open computing infrastructure in which resource allocation and negotiation schemes are incentive-compatible, and individual parties can treat other resources as their own. In this paper we outline key guiding principles for the vision of strategyproof computing, define the strategyproof computing paradigm, and lay out a systems-related research agenda.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101256
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