Person:

Blum, Gabriella

In Ethics for Enemies, Frances Kamm argues that, under certain conditions, it is mor-ally permissible for a state to launch a war for opportunistic reasons. We consider how law might shed light on Kamm’s argument. Part I addresses the application of criminal and tort law to individual acts of violence analogous to the acts of war analyzed by Kamm. It primarily argues that these bodies of law rely on a framework for determining legal permissibility that runs counter to, and perhaps demonstrates weaknesses in, Kamm’s framework for assessing moral permissibility. Part II considers the law of war. It maintains that, although modern law permits certain opportunistic acts of war, the law does so on terms that cut against Kamm’s claim as to their moral permissibility.

Should the United States, as the strongest military power in the world, be bound by stricter humanitarian constraints than its weaker adversaries? Would holding the U.S. to higher standards than the Taliban, Iraqi insurgents, or the North Korean army yield an overall greater humanitarian welfare or be otherwise justified on the basis of international justice theories? Or would it instead be an unjustifiable attempt to curb American power, a form of dangerous "lawfare”?

The paper offers an analytical framework through which to examine these questions. It draws on the design of international trade and climate agreements, where obligations have been linked to capabilities through the principle of Common-but-Differentiated Responsibilities (CDRs), and inquires whether the justifications that have been offered for CDRs in these other regimes are transposable to the laws of war. More broadly, the framework tests the extent to which war can and should be equated to other phenomena of international relations or whether it is a unique context that resists foreign analogies.

Rather than offering a definitive answer, the inquiry illuminates the types of judgments and predictions that one must hold in order to have a position on the desirability of CDRs in international humanitarian law, most notably, the degree to which weaker adversaries will be prone to abusing further constraints on stronger enemies, the expected effects of CDRs on the propensity to go to war, who on the enemy’s side is the “enemy,” and what are the duties that are owed to one’s enemies.

A comparison of American and Israeli courts’ judicial review of counterterrorism operations reveals both similarities and differences in their opinions as to not only what constitutes lawful conduct, but also as to what constitutes war.

This is a chapter from our forthcoming book, 'Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on Terrorism', (MIT Press, September 2010). This chapter addresses the legal, ethical, and strategic aspects of targeted killings as a counterterrorism measure, drawing on the American and Israeli experience. We argue that since terrorism is neither a traditional war nor a traditional crime, its non-traditional nature must affect how, where, and when we employ targeted killings. Specifically, we argue that whether one begins with a law enforcement model or a war model in mind, the ultimate contours of justifiable targeted killings are very similar under either paradigm.

Discussions of whether Bush and Clinton administration lawyers have acted ethically have missed a fundamental point about the attorney-client relationship. It is the client - in this case, the government - who is ultimately responsible for making policy decisions, not the attorney. Too often, the question of what is "legal" has been substituted for what should actually be done, especially in the United States, where "legal" and "desirable" have become so intertwined. Governments should consult with attorneys, but should also be prepared to implement whatever policies they believe are "right," and if necessary to explain any departures from what is "legal" to the pubic, to whom they are ultimately accountable.

Why is it that we don’t punish states anymore, or, at least, don’t admit to doing so?

The moral rhetoric of “crime” and “punishment” of states has been excised from mainstream international law, and replaced with an amoral rhetoric of “threat” and “prevention.” Today, individuals alone are subject to international punishment, while states are subject only to preventive, regulatory or enforcement measures.

Through a historical survey of the shift from punishment to prevention in various spheres of international law, I argue that the preference for prevention has been motivated by a strong preference for peace over justice as the ultimate goal of the international system. Driving this belief, I suggest, is an array of considerations, correlating punishment with humiliation and revenge, fearing the effects of collective punishment, doubting the operation of punishment in a decentralized structure built around the principle of sovereign equality, and bemoaning absence of an international institution to adjudicate the criminality of states. However, given existing practices under the paradigm of “prevention,” none of these considerations seems to justify a correlation between peaceful coexistence and an aversion to punishment.

Even further, the elimination of a punitive paradigm may implicate normative concerns, even accepting the preference for peace: in fact, a prevention-oriented framework may have its own distorted effects for international peace and security. Drawing on debates over preventive sanctions in U.S. domestic criminal law, I argue that even though prevention may sound like a less oppressive policy than punishment, it may in fact be far less constrained and more ruthless. At the same time, a preventive paradigm might be paralyzed from operating where there is a crime that does not immediately threaten other international actors. I demonstrate both possibilities using the contemporary debates over anticipatory self-defense and humanitarian intervention.

What does victory mean today? How do we know who ‘won’ the war and what does the winner win by winning? This article uses the prism of victory to view the transformation of the goals, means, and targets of war, and assesses the applicability of the conventional Just War doctrine (through the traditional laws of war) to the modern battlefield. Specifically, the article claims that the military and civilian components of war have grown so intertwined in both the conduct and ending of hostilities that the laws of war, with their emphasis on combat, are hard-pressed to offer a normative yardstick for a just modern war.

One of the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) is that it recognizes no lesser-evil justification for breaking its rules. Those violating the laws of war will thus be viewed as war criminals even when their conduct was intended to - and in fact did - prevent much greater harm. This Article argues that this deep-rooted absolutist stance undermines the humanitarian drive of the laws of war, and offers, instead, a lesser-evil defense.

The argument begins with the obvious analogy to the necessity defense in domestic criminal law, emphasizing the adaptations that are necessary in order to transpose the domestic concept onto the international plane. It then proceeds to test possible first-order accounts – deontological, consequentialist, and institutional – for why IHL might nonetheless prefer a more absolutist stance than domestic law. It finds that none of these accounts offers a compelling explanation for the exclusion of any lesser-evil justification from IHL.

The Article then proceeds to develop a blueprint for the concept of a humanitarian necessity justification that would exculpate an actor who violated the laws of war in the name of a greater humanitarian good under certain conditions. A central component of the justification, which is required given the special nature of IHL, is a condition that the greater humanitarian good would benefit the enemy, rather than the actor’s own people.

This paper studies the different roles, impact, and operation of bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties as structures within the architecture of international law. I observe that the preference for bilateralism or multilateralism in international lawmaking is often determined not by an informed choice but by an instinctive association of political schools or bureaucratic affiliations with different forms of international regulation. This association, however, is not always founded on a just appreciation of the workings of either form in various contexts or of the way in which the two interact with each other. I set out to offer a framework for such an appreciation and assess the workings of multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties along three dimensions: the contribution of the respective instruments to the advancement of an international rule of law; the operation of the regime in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance; and the democratic legitimacy of the making of each regime. I demonstrate that ideologies and values that seem to be almost blindly associated with one type of regulation may be actually better served, in some cases, by using the other type. Ultimately, this paper attempts to chart a course for more theoretical and empirical forays into the questions of why states join particular types of treaties and how these different types of treaties, or a combination of them, promote or obstruct the attainment of various goals within the architecture of international law.

The regulation of internal armed conflict by international law has come a long way in a very short space of time. Until the early 1990s, there were a minimum of international law rules applicable to internal armed conflict. Today, the situation has changed almost beyond recognition with a healthy body of international law applicable to internal armed conflict. This change has taken place in three principal ways – through analogy to the law of international armed conflict, through resort to international human rights law, and through the use of international criminal law. Each of these approaches stressed its similarity to internal armed conflict or to international humanitarian law. They proved immensely important, filling in what was a more or less blank canvas. However, there are limits to how far they can take us. Today, the canvas is no longer blank and a step back is needed in order to assess the existing state of affairs. Focusing not on the similarities between international and internal armed conflicts or between the various bodies of international law, but on their differences, will allow us to ascertain what further work is in order. It will allow us to identify gaps in regulation and refine relevant rules. It will also force us to re-think our approach to particular issues. Only in this way will we be able to develop the international law of internal armed conflict further.