Person:

Lee, Henry

Expanding estimates of North America’s supply of accessible shale gas, and more recently, shale oil, have been trumpeted in many circles as the most significant energy resource development since the oil boom in Texas in the late 1920s. How large are these resources? What challenges will need to be overcome if their potential is to be realized? How will they impact U.S. energy policy? To address these questions, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and two of its programs, the Environment and Natural Resources Program and the Geopolitics of Energy Project, convened a group of experts from business, government, and academia on May 1, 2012, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The following report summarizes the major issues discussed at this workshop. Since the discussions were off-the-record, no comments are attributed to any individual. Rather, this report attempts to summarize the arguments on all sides of the issues. The policy implications of significant additional supplies of domestic oil and gas to the United States are far ranging. Due to time constraints, many important issues were not covered in the depth that they deserved. Examples would include the impact of additional oil and gas supplies on existing U.S. efforts to reduce carbon emissions and its historical commitment to support other fuels, such as coal and nuclear power, or newer options, such as wind and solar energy. Further, as one participant pointed out, officials from industry are constrained under U.S. antitrust laws from sharing proprietary information.

Electric vehicles (EVs) have advanced significantly this decade, owing in part to decreasing battery costs. Yet EVs remain more costly than gasoline fueled vehicles over their useful life. This paper analyzes the additional advances that will be needed, if electric vehicles are to significantly penetrate the passenger vehicle fleet.

The fast growing Gram-negative bacterium Vibrio natriegens is an attractive microbial system for molecular biology and biotechnology due to its remarkable short generation time1,2 and metabolic prowess3,4. However, efforts to uncover and utilize the mechanisms underlying its rapid growth are hampered by the scarcity of functional genomic data. Here, we develop a pooled genome-wide CRISPR interference (CRISPRi) screen to identify a minimal set of genes required for rapid wild-type growth. Targeting 4,565 (99.7%) of predicted protein-coding genes, our screen uncovered core genes composed of putative essentials and growth-supporting genes which are enriched for respiratory pathways. We found 96% of core genes to be located on the larger chromosome 1, with growth-neutral duplicates of core gene located primarily on chromosome 2. Our screen also refines metabolic pathway annotations by distinguishing functional biosynthetic enzymes from those predicted based on comparative genomics. Taken together, this work provides a broadly applicable platform for high-throughput functional genomics to accelerate biological studies and engineering of V. natriegens.

On June 7, 2018, the Harvard Kennedy School’s Environment and Natural Resources Program and the Center for Science, Technology, and Education Policy at Tsinghua University held the fifth annual Tsinghua-Harvard Workshop on Low-Carbon Development and Public Policy. This event brought together leading experts on climate and energy from academic, business, and government communities in both the United States and China. Previous workshops dealt with technology innovation, climate, market mechanisms to reduce carbon emissions, and local low-carbon initiatives. This year’s workshop focused on electricity systems and renewable energy penetration.

The workshop was divided into three sessions: the first focused on challenges confronting the electricity system in both China and the United States; the second discussed alternative policies to promote and invest in renewable power options; and the last session focused on opportunities and challenges for electric vehicles.

This report is a summary of the major points covered during the workshop. It strives to capture the underlying arguments made by all the participants, including areas in which there was disagreement.

To combat the threat of economic and social disruptions due to climate change, the global community must commit to a long-term goal of deep decarbonization, defined as reducing global greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels to zero or even negative. Ambient CO2 concentrations have been increasing, reaching a monthly mean of 410ppm in 2017 (based on observations at Mauna Loa Observatory). In the past few years, most places in the world have also experienced higher annual average temperatures. In addition, changes in the climate system have already resulted in disruptions, including more severe heat waves, tropical cyclones, droughts, floods, forest fires, and crop damage. Even greater negative impacts are projected in the future. Since CO2 can remain in the atmosphere for centuries, it is not enough to simply slow down the growth of emissions. In the long run, deep decarbonization will be necessary.

A current challenge is to lay the foundations for deep decarbonization, even if energy technologies (including pricing) are not yet up to the task. Climate change is a long-term problem. Urgent action is necessary, but because of the scale of the problem and the time needed to develop new energy systems, the challenge will persist for many decades. Climate and energy policies, today, should be judged not only by how they relate to immediate goals of emissions reduction, but also by how they contribute to providing options for decarbonization pathways in the future.

China and the United States are in position to promote energy technology innovation and tackle climate change. As the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, both countries have the opportunity to assume leadership positions. The landmark Xi-Obama climate agreement announced in 2014 outlined a unique collaboration between these two countries. This bilateral agreement also changed the character of global climate governance, which contributed to the success of the Paris Agreement.

China has made substantial efforts to reduce coal consumption and to increase non-fossil energy, and is currently on track to meet its climate pledges. While coal consumption reached 2.81 billion tce in 2013, it fell to 2.71 billion tce in 2017. The annual growth rate of non-fossil energy supply was 11.2% in 2012-2017. During the 13th Five Year Plan period (2016- 2020), the annual average GDP growth rate is expected to be around 6.5%, while the growth rate for energy consumption and CO2 emissions are anticipated to be only 2% and 1%, respectively. By 2020, the CO2 intensity (the ratio of CO2 emissions to GDP) is expected to decrease by more than 50% compared to 2005 level. It is therefore very likely that China will peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve the targets pledged in the Paris Agreement to increase the share of non-fossil energy to 20% of primary energy.

In the United States, while the Trump Administration decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, efforts have been made by states, cities, business leaders, and universities to continue the support for climate action. The Trump Administration announced its decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2017, and has initiated a process to reverse many of the climate policies implemented by the Obama Administration, including the Clean Power Plan. These actions have damaged the moral authority of U.S. leadership in tackling climate change, and may result in delayed action and reduced funding for mitigation and adaptation efforts. However, about 70% of Americans believe that climate change is happening, and the percentage is even higher among young people. More than 2,800 leaders from cities, states, universities, and companies have signed the “We are Still In” declaration to stand by the Paris Agreement.

Given the present-day situation, two lines of cooperation between Chinese and U.S. scholars are especially valuable. The first is to work with each other to promote climate action from all entities, rather than be limited to government negotiations. The bottom-up action from states, cities, counties, universities, businesses, and investors provides opportunities for new forms of partnership between a wide range of actors to pursue ambitious climate goals. Second, organizations in both countries can partner with each other to flesh out and evaluate policies for innovation, mitigation, and adaptation, so that when the opportunities present themselves, actions can be taken.

China and the United States together emit more than 40 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide (CO2) according to the latest available data.[1] Therefore any successful global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must include meaningful contributions from both countries. Each country has started down this path by committing to reduce CO2 emissions and both have announced plans, policies, and programs to meet those commitments. However, the character of the carbon problem in each country is different and so while the plans, programs, and policies they are pursuing have some similarities, the emphasis is different.

China has committed to stabilize its greenhouse gas emissions and increase the percent of non-fossil fuel energy to 20% by 2030. This goal will require significant programmatic and policy changes across all sectors of its economy. The challenge is how to make these changes without incurring measurable political and economic costs. Ideally governments will draw lessons from efforts in other countries, but the Chinese system is unique. Hence it has created its own learning experiences by investing in multiple pilot policies and programs at the provincial and city levels.

Many of China’s cities are very large and include multiple districts, counties, and neighborhoods; and each one can serve as the locus of a separate low carbon pilot. These pilots are designed by local officials that are informed by guidelines from the central government. Thus, China often will have many “policy experiments” all taking place simultaneously. Lessons from these pilots are then used in the development of national and provincial programs and guidelines that shape future local initiatives across the country. These pilots are the ultimate example of “learning by doing.”

In designing low-carbon development strategies, China has relied heavily on multiple pilots. In 2010 and 2012, its National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) approved pilots to reduce carbon emissions in six provinces and 36 cities. One of the cities was Chongqing, which is one of the largest cities in the world, measured by area (82,400 square kilometers) or by population (30.16 million people). To put Chongqing in perspective, the city’s population is about 77% of that of California’s. It is divided into 21 districts and 17 counties. In 2015, its GDP reached $240 billion, which is equivalent to Finland’s.

Chongqing is located in southwest China and is the economic center of the upper Yangtze basin. It is one of five national central cities and has the same jurisdictional status as a Province.

This policy brief synthesizes existing studies on the impacts of the low-carbon pilots implemented by the city of Chongqing and draws insights from these experiences for the development of national policies and programs.

The Chinese government has repeatedly embraced a goal of developing and deploying electric vehicles (EVs) as it attempts to transition its passenger fleet away from conventional gasoline and diesel-fueled cars. China’s commitment to EVs is driven by the negative health impacts from local air pollution and anxiety over the country’s growing reliance on imported oil and the energy security problems that accompany it. China’s goal is to have five million EVs on the road by the end of 2020, increasing to over 80 million by 2030.

This paper addresses two questions:

1. Is China likely to succeed in meeting its ambitious EV goals?

2. Will EV deployment reduce greenhouse gas emissions as compared to the continued use of conventional gasoline-fueled cars? This question is answered from both an operational and a lifecycle perspective.

The Harvard-Tsinghua Workshop on Low-Carbon Development and Public Policy is the fourth annual joint workshop between the Harvard Kennedy School’s Environment and Natural Resources Program and the Center for Science, Technology, and Education Policy at Tsinghua University. The workshop convened leading experts on climate and energy from the United States and China at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China, on June 1-2, 2017.

The workshop was divided into five sessions. The first two sessions focused on the scope of the climate problem and the options for addressing it. The following three sessions explored specific options: renewable energy, nuclear power, and air pollution regulation.

Stabilizing the climate system requires substantial reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, mainly through changes in energy systems that are currently dominated by fossil fuels. In the Paris Agreement, countries pledged to take voluntary carbon mitigation actions over the next 10-15 years. The climate system responds to cumulative GHG emissions, and carbon dioxide (CO2) can remain in the atmosphere for several centuries. Therefore, stabilizing CO2 emissions is not sufficient. The goal must be one of deep decarbonization, reducing global CO2 emissions to zero by the end of this century.

As the first and second largest CO2 emitters in the world, both China and the United States face critical challenges in the design, development, and implementation of deep decarbonization. China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions by 2030, and to increase the share of non-fossil energy in total primary energy to 20%. The United States pledged to reduce its carbon emissions by 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025, a goal that is now being questioned as a result of President Trump’s recent decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. While these targets promise near- and mid-term steps to mitigate carbon emissions, much stronger efforts will be needed after 2030 to eventually achieve zero or negative emissions. Therefore, the path towards deep decarbonization will likely involve multiple stages, and the policy priorities will vary with each stage. For instance, the first stage, pre-2030, will focus on increasing wind and solar generation, and replacing coal with natural gas. The second stage, from 2030-2050, may focus on a continuing expansion of renewables, deployment of storage technologies, as well as electrification of the transport, heating, and industrial sectors. The third stage, post-2050, may focus on deploying CCS for natural gas use, biofuels and synthetic fuels, as well as advanced nuclear technologies.

Compared to the United States, the fundamental challenge faced by China is its heavy reliance on coal. Analyses on potential decarbonization pathways for China highlight two findings. First, reducing carbon emissions beyond stabilization will be difficult. Multiple factors have contributed to reductions in the use of coal, including economic slowdown and the urgency to curb conventional air pollution. Under various assumptions on GDP growth projections, urbanization rates, and reductions in carbon intensity, the CO2 emissions peak is anticipated before 2030. However, the share of emissions from the electricity sector as a percentage of China’s total emissions is expected to continue to grow beyond 2030. A few key variables that will affect such a change after 2030 include the speed of renewable and nuclear scale-up, the level of efficiency improvement of incumbent coal power fleet, and the development of natural gas plants to meet demand when renewable energy is interrupted. In summary, it is widely acknowledged that achieving an energy mix that is decarbonized (necessary for deep reduction in carbon emissions) is a much more difficult task than the near-term target of 20-25% (necessary for peaking carbon emissions

Second, deep decarbonization scenarios for China’s energy system often depend on significantly scaling up renewable and nuclear generation in the electricity sector, as well as electrification efforts in the end-use sectors. Although these scenarios are carefully designed based on a deep understanding of China’s current energy system and projected growth, they still contain uncertainties. How to manage the intermittency problems for renewables and address safety concerns for nuclear energy are important challenges in almost every decarbonization scenario.

In this report, we start with a summary of the three key topics: electricity sector reform, synergies between climate and air pollution control efforts, and nuclear power development. We then focus on four cross-cutting themes that are relevant for all three topics: (a) implications of current policies on long-term decarbonization, (b) challenges in energy and climate governance, (c) public participation and engagement, and (d) decarbonization and the pursuit of other societal goals. Finally, we draw some preliminary conclusions and discuss potential directions for future scenarios.

For the past forty years, United States Presidents have repeatedly called for a reduction in the country's dependence on fossil fuels in general and foreign oil specifically. Stronger efficiency standards and higher taxes on motor fuels are a step in this direction, but achieving even greater reductions in oil consumption will require changing the way Americans power their transportation system. Some officials advocate the electrification of the passenger vehicle fleet as a path to meeting this goal. The Obama administration has, for example, embraced a goal of having one million electric-powered vehicles on U.S. roads by 2015, while others proposed a medium-term goal where electric vehicles would consist of 20% of the passenger vehicle fleet by 2030—approximately 30 million electric vehicles. The technology itself is not in question—many of the global automobile companies are planning to sell plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and/or battery electric vehicles (BEVs) by 2012. The key question is, will Americans buy them? The answer depends on four additional questions: 1. Is the cost of purchasing and operating an electric vehicle more or less expensive than the cost of a comparable conventional gasoline-powered vehicle? 2. Are the comparative costs likely to change over the next twenty years? 3. Do electric vehicles provide the same attributes as conventional cars, and if not, do the differences matter? 4. Will electric car owners be able to access the electricity needed to power their vehicles? This paper attempts to answer these four questions.