Person:

Nowak, Martin

Major efforts to sequence cancer genomes are now occurring throughout the world. Though the emerging data from these studies are illuminating, their reconciliation with epidemiologic and clinical observations poses a major challenge. In the current study, we provide a novel mathematical model that begins to address this challenge. We model tumors as a discrete time branching process that starts with a single driver mutation and proceeds as each new driver mutation leads to a slightly increased rate of clonal expansion. Using the model, we observe tremendous variation in the rate of tumor development - providing an understanding of the heterogeneity in tumor sizes and development times that have been observed by epidemiologists and clinicians. Furthermore, the model provides a simple formula for the number of driver mutations as a function of the total number of mutations in the tumor. Finally, when applied to recent experimental data, the model allows us to calculate, for the first time, the actual selective advantage provided by typical somatic mutations in human tumors in situ. This selective advantage is surprisingly small, 0.005 +- 0.0005, and has major implications for experimental cancer research.

In solid tumors, targeted treatments can lead to dramatic regressions, but responses are often short-lived because resistant cancer cells arise. The major strategy proposed for overcoming resistance is combination therapy. We present a mathematical model describing the evolutionary dynamics of lesions in response to treatment. We first studied 20 melanoma patients receiving vemurafenib. We then applied our model to an independent set of pancreatic, colorectal, and melanoma cancer patients with metastatic disease. We find that dual therapy results in long-term disease control for most patients, if there are no single mutations that cause cross-resistance to both drugs; in patients with large disease burden, triple therapy is needed. We also find that simultaneous therapy with two drugs is much more effective than sequential therapy. Our results provide realistic expectations for the efficacy of new drug combinations and inform the design of trials for new cancer therapeutics. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.00747.001

During replication, RNA viruses rapidly generate diverse mutant progeny which differ in their ability to kill host cells. We report that the progeny of a single RNA viral genome diversified during hundreds of passages in cell culture and self-organized into two genetically distinct subpopulations that exhibited the competition-colonization dynamics previously recognized in many classical ecological systems. Viral colonizers alone were more efficient in killing cells than competitors in culture. In cells coinfected with both competitors and colonizers, viral interference resulted in reduced cell killing, and competitors replaced colonizers. Mathematical modeling of this coinfection dynamics predicted selection to be density dependent, which was confirmed experimentally. Thus, as is known for other ecological systems, biodiversity and even cell killing of virus populations can be shaped by a tradeoff between competition and colonization. Our results suggest a model for the evolution of virulence in viruses based on internal interactions within mutant spectra of viral quasispecies.

Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.