Distributive Politics and Economic Growth
| Title: | Distributive Politics and Economic Growth |
| Author: |
Rodrik, Dani; Alesina, Alberto
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Alesina, Alberto, and Dani Rodrik. 1994. Distributive politics and economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, no. 2: 465-490. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
alesina_distributive.pdf (919.3Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | We study the relationship between politics and economic growth in a simple model of endogenous growth with distributive conflict among agents endowed with varying capital/labor shares. We establish several results regarding the factor ownership of the median individual and the level of taxation, redistribution, and growth. Policies that maximize growth are optimal only for a government that cares solely about pure "capitalists." The greater the inequality of wealth and income, the higher the rate of taxation, and the lower growth. We present empirical results that show that inequality in land and income ownership is negatively correlated with subsequent economic growth. |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118470 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4551798 |
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