dc.contributor.author | Fudenberg, Drew | |
dc.contributor.author | Imhof, Lorens | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-22T13:59:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Fudenberg, Drew, and Lorens A. Imhof. 2008. Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations. Journal of Economic Theory 140, no. 1: 229-245. | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196338 | |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the aspiration-and-imitation process of Binmore and Samuelson [Muddling through: noisy equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 74 (1997) 235–265] and the related processes proposed by Benaı¨m and Weibull [Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games, Econometrica 71 (2003) 873–903] and Traulsen et al. [Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 (2005) 238701], as well as the frequency-dependent Moran process studied by Fudenberg et al. [Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation, Theoretical Population Biol. 70 (2006) 352–363]. We illustrate our results by considering the effect of the number of periods of repetition on the selected equilibrium in repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma when players are restricted to a small set of simple strategies. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | Economics | en |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en |
dc.publisher | Elsevier Science B.V. | en |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.002 | en |
dash.license | LAA | |
dc.subject | equilibrium selection | en |
dc.subject | learning model | en |
dc.subject | limit distribution | en |
dc.subject | prisoner's dilemma | en |
dc.subject | Markov process | en |
dc.title | Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations | en |
dc.relation.journal | Journal of Economic Theory | en |
dash.depositing.author | Fudenberg, Drew | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.002 | * |
dash.contributor.affiliated | Fudenberg, Drew | |