Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
| Title: | Large Shareholders and Corporate Control |
| Author: |
Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W.
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94(3): 461-488. |
| Access Status: | At the direction of the depositing author this work is not currently accessible through DASH. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Shleifer_IndustralizationBigPush.pdf (2.409Mb; PDF) 
|
| Abstract: | In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences? |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261385 |
| Other Sources: | http://ws1.ad.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/lg_shareholders.pdf |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3606237 |
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FAS Scholarly Articles [5137]
Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
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