Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

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Title: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Author: Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W.

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Citation: Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94(3): 461-488.
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Abstract: In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences?
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