Against Intentionalism

DSpace/Manakin Repository

dc.contributor.author	Nickel, Bernhard
dc.date.accessioned	2011-01-29T18:24:04Z
dc.date.issued	2007
dc.identifier.citation	Nickel, Bernhard. 2007. Against intentionalism. Philosophical Studies 136(3): 279-304.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0031-8116	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4692278
dc.description.abstract	Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to superficially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke’s examples cannot be extended to mine. If Intentionalism fails, it is impossible to reduce the phenomenology of an experience to its content.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Philosophy	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Springer Verlag	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	doi:10.1007/s11098-005-2013-2	en_US
dc.relation.hasversion	http://www.bernhardnickel.net/papers/intentionalism.pdf	en_US
dash.license	LAA
dc.title	Against Intentionalism	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Author's Original	en_US
dc.relation.journal	Philosophical Studies -Minneapolis then Dordrecht-	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Nickel, Bernhard
dc.date.available	2011-01-29T18:24:04Z