FAS Theses and Dissertations

Across three chapters, this dissertation investigates the psychological processes that underlie people’s decisions to trust others based on their personal perspectives on social issues. The first two chapters focus on contexts traditionally dominated by objectivity norms (e.g., science, journalism) where professionals’ suppression of their personal views is seen as a virtue in service of truth. The third chapter examines the interpersonal consequences of withholding one’s views on sociopolitical issues in workplace conversations more broadly. Across these chapters, my findings challenge existing work on when and why people trust others. With the intention of protecting public trust in the news, journalists are often asked to recuse themselves from reporting on topics on which they may be perceived as biased, such as when they have prior life experiences of harm related to the topic (e.g., a journalist who has previously been assaulted reporting on assault). Thus, journalists frequently attempt to predict how their known life experiences or backgrounds will influence public perceptions. In Chapter 1, I ask whether individuals, including journalists themselves, accurately anticipate the impact of a journalist’s related prior experience of harm on public trust. Across three studies (N = 2,290), I find that people systematically overestimate how much these experiences undermine perceptions of objectivity and trustworthiness. I conclude by considering how inaccurate second-order beliefs (i.e., beliefs about normative beliefs) regarding who will be viewed as objective and trustworthy may lead to misguided decisions around how to maintain public trust. Building on Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examines how inferred motives shape trust in experts with related prior experiences of harm across a variety of professional contexts (e.g., social work, criminal investigation, scientific research, journalism; 5 studies, N = 1,954). Existing research suggests that prior victims will be viewed as more biased compared to non-victims and specifically more motivated to reach conclusions that align with their own self-interests (i.e., “directional motives”). For example, Black journalists reporting on racial prejudice and female scientists researching sexism often face accusations of bias. However, I find that prior victims are not only believed to possess stronger directional motives than non-victims but are also believed to have stronger accuracy motives—desires to uncover the truth. In turn, these two motive inferences have competing effects on trust in the expert’s accuracy. Finally, in Chapter 3, I examine how employees view coworkers who avoid answering questions about their personal views on sociopolitical issues in workplace conversations. My findings contrast with existing research which has found that coworkers who avoid expressing their views (e.g., by saying, “I don’t want to discuss politics right now”) are perceived as less trustworthy even compared to those who express opposing views. Across a pilot study and five primary studies (N = 3,455), I find that employees perceive coworkers who avoid taking a stance as more benevolent and higher in integrity—both crucial bases of trust—than coworkers who espouse opposing views. Still, alignment on the issue (i.e., whether employees agree or disagree with the coworker) moderates the effects of avoidance versus stance-taking. While employees perceive misaligned avoiders as higher in integrity and benevolence than misaligned stance-takers, they view aligned avoiders as lower in integrity than aligned stance-takers (and no different in benevolence). I conclude by discussing the practical and theoretical implications of the finding that employees view coworkers who agree with them as more trustworthy when they engage in conversation but those who disagree as more trustworthy when they stay out of it.