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Dodell-Feder, David

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Dodell-Feder

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Dodell-Feder, David
Author's Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.2b71a2ee-4efa-46b9-b459-21cb42686c9d

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    Using Fiction to Assess Mental State Understanding: A New Task for Assessing Theory of Mind in Adults
    (Public Library of Science, 2013) Dodell-Feder, David; Lincoln, Sarah Hope; Coulson, Joseph P.; Hooker, Christine
    Social functioning depends on the ability to attribute and reason about the mental states of others – an ability known as theory of mind (ToM). Research in this field is limited by the use of tasks in which ceiling effects are ubiquitous, rendering them insensitive to individual differences in ToM ability and instances of subtle ToM impairment. Here, we present data from a new ToM task – the Short Story Task (SST) - intended to improve upon many aspects of existing ToM measures. More specifically, the SST was designed to: (a) assess the full range of individual differences in ToM ability without suffering from ceiling effects; (b) incorporate a range of mental states of differing complexity, including epistemic states, affective states, and intentions to be inferred from a first- and second-order level; (c) use ToM stimuli representative of real-world social interactions; (d) require participants to utilize social context when making mental state inferences; (e) exhibit adequate psychometric properties; and (f) be quick and easy to administer and score. In the task, participants read a short story and were asked questions that assessed explicit mental state reasoning, spontaneous mental state inference, and comprehension of the non-mental aspects of the story. Responses were scored according to a rubric that assigned greater points for accurate mental state attributions that included multiple characters’ mental states. Results demonstrate that the SST is sensitive to variation in ToM ability, can be accurately scored by multiple raters, and exhibits concurrent validity with other social cognitive tasks. The results support the effectiveness of this new measure of ToM in the study of social cognition. The findings are also consistent with studies demonstrating significant relationships among narrative transportation, ToM, and the reading of fiction. Together, the data indicate that reading fiction may be an avenue for improving ToM ability.
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    The neural basis of theory of mind and its relationship to social functioning and social anhedonia in individuals with schizophrenia☆
    (Elsevier, 2013) Dodell-Feder, David; Tully, Laura M.; Lincoln, Sarah Hope; Hooker, Christine
    Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to attribute and reason about the mental states of others, is a strong determinant of social functioning among individuals with schizophrenia. Identifying the neural bases of ToM and their relationship to social functioning may elucidate functionally relevant neurobiological targets for intervention. ToM ability may additionally account for other social phenomena that affect social functioning, such as social anhedonia (SocAnh). Given recent research in schizophrenia demonstrating improved neural functioning in response to increased use of cognitive skills, it is possible that SocAnh, which decreases one's opportunity to engage in ToM, could compromise social functioning through its deleterious effect on ToM-related neural circuitry. Here, twenty individuals with schizophrenia and 18 healthy controls underwent fMRI while performing the False-Belief Task. Aspects of social functioning were assessed using multiple methods including self-report (Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Social Adjustment Scale), clinician-ratings (Global Functioning Social Scale), and performance-based tasks (MSCEIT—Managing Emotions). SocAnh was measured with the Revised Social Anhedonia Scale. Region-of-interest and whole-brain analyses revealed reduced recruitment of medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) for ToM in individuals with schizophrenia. Across all participants, activity in this region correlated with most social variables. Mediation analysis revealed that neural activity for ToM in MPFC accounted for the relationship between SocAnh and social functioning. These findings demonstrate that reduced recruitment of MPFC for ToM is an important neurobiological determinant of social functioning. Furthermore, SocAhn may affect social functioning through its impact on ToM-related neural circuitry. Together, these findings suggest ToM ability as an important locus for intervention.
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    The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents
    (Public Library of Science, 2014) Jenkins, Adrianna C.; Dodell-Feder, David; Saxe, Rebecca; Knobe, Joshua
    In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals—i.e., brain regions associated with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus—does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets' mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous). Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves.