Person:

Minor, Dylan Blu

We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test our predictions using novel executive compensation contract data, and find that firms with more shareholder-friendly corporate governance are more likely to provide compensation to executives linked to firm social performance outcomes. Also, providing executives with direct incentives for CSR is an effective tool to increase firm social performance. The findings provide evidence identifying corporate governance as a determinant of managerial incentives for social performance, and suggest that CSR activities are more likely to be beneficial to shareholders, as opposed to an agency cost.

We examine misconduct in financial services. We propose a theory in which experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm’s brand and their own skills. Using sales complaint data for insurance agents, we find that agents working exclusively for large branded firms are more likely to be the subject of justified sales complaints, relative to smaller independent experts, despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more complaints per year.

When seeking new leaders, business and government organizations alike often need individuals that are less risk averse, or even risk-seeking, in order to improve performance. However, individuals amenable to increased risk-taking may be more likely to engage in misconduct. To study this issue, we explore US political scandals and the implicated politicians’ portfolio choices. We find that a politician allocating all of her portfolio to risky investments has double the odds of being involved in a political sandal compared to a politician allocating all of her portfolio to safe investments. This suggests that those who are more willing to take risks in their personal finances are also more likely to engage in misconduct. We validate portfolio choice as a measure of risk preferences by correlating actual high-stakes investment choices (average $700,000 US) to conventional laboratory lottery choices (average $51 US) of wealthy investors.

We explore the notion that corporate citizenship, as obtained through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), is used by managers to protect firm value, helping their firm better withstand negative business shocks. We formally explore two parallel mechanisms for such protection .one of building moral capital (CSR Contributions) and another of improving investor posteriors (CSR Investments). We find some theoretical and empirical support for both of these, but in different settings. In particular, we find that firms with higher CSR Investments enjoy an average of $1 billion of saved firm value upon an adverse event. In contrast, CSR Contribution firms lose value (on average) upon an event, possibly due to disingenuous contributions. Meanwhile, due to managerial moral hazard, firms with high levels of CSR Contributions face adverse events more often, whereas those with high levels of CSR Investments face them less often.

Platform competition is ubiquitous, yet platform market structure is little understood. Theory models typically suffer from equilibrium multiplicity—platforms might coexist or the market might tip to either platform. We use laboratory experiments to study the outcomes of platform competition. When platforms are primarily vertically differentiated, we find that even when platform coexistence is theoretically possible, markets inevitably tip to the more efficient platform. When platforms are primarily horizontally differentiated, so there is no single efficient platform, we find strong evidence of equilibrium coexistence.

While there has been a lot of research on finding and developing top performers in the workplace, less attention has been paid to the question of how to manage those workers who are harmful to organizational performance. In extreme cases, in addition to hurting performance, such workers can generate enormous regulatory and legal liabilities for the firm. We explore a large novel dataset of over 50,000 workers across 11 different firms to document a variety of aspects of workers’ characteristics and circumstances that lead them to engage in "toxic" behavior. We also find that avoiding a toxic worker (or converting him to an average worker) enhances performance to a much greater extent than replacing an average worker with a superstar worker.

We experimentally study ways in which the social preferences of individuals and groups affect performance when faced with relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding workers tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a team of workers has complex consequences for organizational performance.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how firms organize to engage in non-market strategy. To achieve this end, we explore the organization of non-market strategy via a formal model of the firm. The model is motivated by a qualitative study of the organization of non-market strategy of 25 large, U.S. firms. We found that firms either integrate non-market strategy activities throughout the firm or create stand-alone business units that specialize in non-market strategy activities. We find that the advantage of integration over specialization is U-shaped in the importance of non-market strategy to the firm's market strategy. We identify several other factors that predict the advantage (and disadvantage) of integration over specialization. The value of this paper is that it is (to the best of our knowledge) the first to identify the factors that should cause a firm to either integrate or specialize the organization of its non-market strategy. It also develops an original typology of the organization of non-market strategy.

We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the stronger player wins. We present a two-stage model that yields the following main results: (1) a shadow effect—the stronger the expected future competitor, the lower the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage; and (2) an effort spillover effect—previous effort reduces the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage. We test our theory predictions using data from high-stakes tournaments. Empirical results suggest that shadow and spillover effects influence match outcomes and have already been priced into betting markets.