Person:

John, Leslie

Drawing from a content analysis of publicly traded companies’ privacy notices, a survey of managers, a field study, and five online experiments, this research investigates how consumers respond to privacy notices. A privacy notice, by placing legally enforceable limits on a firm's data practices, communicating safeguards, and signaling transparency, might be expected to promote confidence that personal data will not be misused. Indeed, most managers expected a privacy notice to make customers feel more secure (Study 1). Yet, consistent with the analogy that bulletproof glass can increase feelings of vulnerability despite the protection offered, formal privacy notices undermined consumer trust and decreased purchase interest even when they emphasized objective protection (Studies 2, 3, and 5) or omitted any mention of potentially concerning data practices (Study 6). These unintended consequences did not occur, however, when consumers had an a priori reason to be distrustful (Study 4) or when benevolence cues were added to privacy notices (Studies 5 and 6). Finally, Study 7 showed that both the presence and conspicuous absence of privacy information are sufficient to trigger decreased purchase intent. Together, these results provide actionable guidance to managers on how to effectively convey privacy information (without hurting purchase interest).

As technological advances enable consumers to share more information in unprecedented ways, today’s disclosure takes on a variety of new forms, triggering a paradigm shift in what “disclosure” entails. This review introduces two factors to conceptualize consumer disclosure: how (i.e., actively versus passively) and between whom (i.e., consumers and/or firms) disclosure occurs. We begin by exploring the drivers of active disclosure occurring in both social and commercial contexts: characteristics of (1) the discloser, (2) the situation in which the disclosure occurs, (3) the information being disclosed, and (4) others. Additionally, we review the limited but growing research on passive disclosure by focusing on (1) inferences observers make based on passively shared information, and (2) expectations disclosers have regarding the use and collection of passively shared information. Because the current understanding of passive disclosure is limited, we also outline what we see as fruitful avenues of future research. We conclude by pointing out what we perceive as key managerial insights.

We posit that the desire to disclose personal information, and the desire to conceal it, are related yet distinct psychological motives. People often wish to conceal information, such as embarrassing aspects of the self. Yet people also seek to reveal information, such as a laudable achievement. These motives often go hand in hand. However, sometimes people experience both desires simultaneously. This idea—that people can simultaneously feel both desires—helps to account for the seemingly paradoxical choices people make with respect to the care and control of their personal data—i.e., information privacy.

Leaders’ perceived authenticity—the sense that leaders are acting in accordance with their “true self”—is associated with positive outcomes for both employees and organizations alike. How might leaders foster this impression? We show that sensitive self-disclosure, in the form of revealing weaknesses, makes leaders come across as authentic (Studies 1 & 2)—because observers infer that the discloser is not engaging in strategic self-presentation (Study 3). Further, the authenticity gains of sensitive self-disclosure have positive downstream consequences, such as enhancing employees’ desire to work with the leader (Studies 4A and 4B). And, as our conceptual account predicts, these benefits emerge when the revealed weakness is made voluntarily (as opposed to by requirement) (Study 5), and are more pronounced if the disclosure is made by a relatively high-status person (Study 6). We also present anecdotal field evidence (Study 7) consistent with the causal effects identified in Studies 1–6.

Managers and policymakers regularly rely on incentives to encourage valued behaviors. While incentives are often successful, there are also notable and surprising examples of their ineffectiveness. Why? We propose a contributing factor may be that they are not sufficiently conspicuous. In a large-scale field experiment (Experiment 1) and three online experiments (Experiments 2-4), we show that even when incentives are transparently provided, failing to make them conspicuous vastly undermines their ability to shift behavior. Online experiments indicate that conspicuous incentives work by increasing people’s extrinsic motivation to earn an incentive (Experiment 2) and do not merely serve as reminders to act (Experiment 3). We also assess whether people intuit that incentive conspicuousness matters (Experiment 4); nearly half of participants reject a costless opportunity to make their own incentives conspicuous, which leads them to earn less than they otherwise would. Yet, our results also hint at some degree of sophistication: those who benefit most from making incentives conspicuous are particularly likely to choose to make their incentives conspicuous.

Seven preregistered studies ( N = 2,890, adult participants) conducted in the field, in the lab, and online documented opportunity neglect: a tendency to reject opportunities with low probability of success even when they come with little or no objective cost (e.g., time, money, reputation). Participants rejected a low-probability opportunity in an everyday context (Study 1). Participants also rejected incentive-compatible gambles with positive expected value—for both goods (Study 2) and money (Studies 3–7)—even with no possibility of monetary loss and nontrivial rewards (e.g., a 1% chance at $99). Participants rejected low-probability opportunities more frequently than high-probability opportunities with equal expected value (Study 3). Although taking some real-life opportunities comes with costs, we show that people are even willing to incur costs to opt out of low-probability opportunities (Study 4). Opportunity neglect can be mitigated by highlighting that rejecting an opportunity is equivalent to choosing a zero probability of success (Studies 6–7).

Many governments have introduced sugary-drink excise taxes to reduce purchasing and consumption of such drinks; however, they do not typically stipulate how such taxes should be communicated at the point of purchase. Historical, field, and experimental data consisting of more than 225,000 purchase decisions indicated that introducing a $0.01-per-ounce sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) tax—without making it salient on price tags—had no significant effect on purchasing (−1.26%, p = .28). However, when the phrase “includes sugary drink tax” was added to tax-inclusive price tags, SSB purchasing was lower than (a) in the pretax period (−9.78%, p < .001), (b) in a posttax period when drinks did not bear price tags (−5.04%, p < .001), and (c) in a posttax period when drinks bore tax-inclusive price tags that did not mention the tax (−3.83%, p = .002). Making the tax’s beneficiary (student programs) salient on price tags had no added effect. Two follow-up studies suggested that tax salience was effective partly because consumers overestimated the tax amount, leading to reduced purchase intentions.