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Hall, Edward

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Edward

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Hall, Edward

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Comments on Woodward, "Making Things Happen"
(Pubblicazioni della Stazione Zoologica di Napoli, 2006) Hall, Edward
Metaphysically Reductive Causation
(Springer Science + Business Media, 2013) Hall, Edward; Paul, L. A.
There are, by now, many rival, sophisticated philosophical accounts of causation that qualify as ‘metaphysically reductive’. A good thing: these collective efforts have vastly improved our understanding of causation over the last 30 years or so. They also put us in an excellent position to reflect on some central methodological questions: What exactly is the point of offering a metaphysical reduction of causation? What philosophical scruples ought to guide the pursuit of such a reduction? Finally, how should answers to these latter questions affect one’s assessment of the main contemporary approaches? That’s the stuff we’ll be investigating in this essay. Section 1 will lay out our presuppositions. Section 2 will review a sample of philosophical accounts. Then comes the main event: Section 3 will look in detail at the foregoing methodological questions, closing with a reconsideration of our sample accounts, in light of what we’ve found.
Laws and causation
(Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011) Hall, Edward
Comments on Michael Strevens's Depth
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) Hall, Edward
The Large-Scale Joints of the World
(Edizioni ETS, 2011) Hall, Edward
David Lewis's Metaphysics
(Stanford Universty, 2010) Hall, Edward
Structural Equations and Causation
(Springer Verlag, 2007) Hall, Edward
Structural equations have become increasingly popular in recent years as tools for understanding causation. But standard structural equations approaches to causation face deep problems. The most philosophically interesting of these consists in their failure to incorporate a distinction between default states of an object or system, and deviations therefrom. Exploring this problem, and how to fix it, helps to illuminate the central role this distinction plays in our causal thinking.