Metaphysically Reductive Causation

Abstract

There are, by now, many rival, sophisticated philosophical accounts of causation that qualify as ‘metaphysically reductive’. A good thing: these collective efforts have vastly improved our understanding of causation over the last 30 years or so. They also put us in an excellent position to reflect on some central methodological questions: What exactly is the point of offering a metaphysical reduction of causation? What philosophical scruples ought to guide the pursuit of such a reduction? Finally, how should answers to these latter questions affect one’s assessment of the main contemporary approaches? That’s the stuff we’ll be investigating in this essay. Section 1 will lay out our presuppositions. Section 2 will review a sample of philosophical accounts. Then comes the main event: Section 3 will look in detail at the foregoing methodological questions, closing with a reconsideration of our sample accounts, in light of what we’ve found.